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**A City for all our Citizens**

**Reflections on 'Shared Cities'**

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**Robin WILSON**  
*Democratic Dialogue*

Directorate General IV: Education, Culture and Heritage, Youth and Sport  
Directorate of Culture and Cultural and Natural Heritage  
Cultural policy and Action Department

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Robin Wilson

## Preface

This paper explores the lessons of the Council of Europe’s project on ‘shared cities’, part of the *Intercultural Dialogue and Conflict Prevention* Project carried out in the framework of the Steering Committee for Culture (CDCULT). It seeks to connect this to the other aspects of the programme, on ‘peace enclaves/peace cradles’ and ‘flagship initiatives’. And it sets out the elements of a draft recommendation for decision-makers and non-governmental actors, as well as suggesting what ‘shared cities’ can themselves do in this regard.

The paper is based on five case studies conducted in 2002—embracing Belfast (Northern Ireland), Mitrovica (Kosovo/a), Narva (Estonia), Nicosia (Cyprus) and Uzhgorod (Ukraine)—and their discussion at a round table organised by the Council of Europe in Frankfurt-an-der-Oder (Germany) on the 15 – 17 December 2002. It draws too on relevant Council of Europe material, such as the report of the Expert Colloquy on “Dialogue serving intercultural and inter-religious communication” held in Strasbourg (France) on 7 – 9 October 2002. By way of introduction, a contextualising framework as to the nature of the city is offered for the subsequent empirical discussion. This also adduces evidence from cities outside the five cases, particularly with a view to including cities which have experienced significant Muslim migration in recent decades.

Responsibility for the content of the paper rests with the author alone and any view expressed should not be assumed to reflect official positions of the Council of Europe.

## Introduction: the nature of the city

It has been claimed that 80 per cent of the population of contemporary Europe lives in cities (Landry, 2003: 8) But what is the city?

The noun ‘city’ and the related adjective ‘civic’ share the same Latin root in ‘citizen’ (*civis*), via the notion of citizenship (*civitas*). Aristotle made the connection between the individual and civic life in his comment (cited in Hall, 1999: 2) ‘that man is by nature a political animal, and a man that is by nature and not merely by fortune citiless is either low in the scale of humanity or above it’.

It is the same root, too, as ‘civilisation’. From the Athens of the Greek *polis* to 1920s Berlin, the various ‘golden ages’ of civilisation surveyed by Peter Hall (1999) are all *urban* ages. For him, the ‘global city’ represents a ‘creative milieu’, which shows what the city can attain at its apogee.

But what makes a ‘creative city’? Charles Landry (2003: 5) argues that in a globalising environment in which cities are competing for international attention, ‘their cultural distinctiveness is perhaps the unique asset they have to offer the external world’. The associated positive images makes the city a magnet for investment, visitors, migrants—a magnet more powerful than others which might otherwise drain these physical, human and social resources away.

Key to that achievement is the outsider, *l'étranger, der Auslander*, such as the Jew in Vienna before the first world war. As with Renaissance Florence, Elizabethan London or late 19<sup>th</sup>-century Paris, the global city has sucked in creative forces. Of classical Athens, Hall (1999: 21-22) writes: ‘And it emerges that it was these outsiders, half inside the culture but half excluded from it, who were the true progenitors of the Athenian miracle.’ In a more prosaic modern example, Landry and Bianchini (1995: 25) point to the remarkable impact in recent years upon previously undistinguished British urban cuisine of the proliferation of ‘ethnic’ and national eating places.

Cultural creativity, they stress, stems from inter- rather than multi-culturalism (Landry and Bianchini, 1995: 25)—a theme which will recur throughout this paper: ‘Many social and cultural policies have

aimed at multiculturalism, which means the strengthening of the separate cultural identities of ethnic minorities, which now have their own arts centres, schools, places of worship and social clubs. But multiculturalism can be problematic if there is little communication between cultures. We now need to move one stage further. Resources should now be directed more to intercultural projects which build bridges between the fragments, and produce something new out of the multicultural patchwork of our cities. Creativity may be encouraged by fragmentation, but not by marginalisation. Ethnic ghettos are unlikely to contribute to solving the wider problems of cities.'

The respected architect Richard Rogers agrees. For him (Urban Task Force, 1999: 26, 41), 'The city is, first and foremost, a meeting place for people.' At its best, it operates as 'a series of interconnected networks of places and spaces devoted to making the most of human interaction.'

Similarly, for Ash Amin and Nigel Thrift (2002: 3, 30, 40), 'urban life is the irreducible product of mixture', a site of '*moments of encounter*', of 'unexpected juxtapositions'. France Lebon (2002: 11) too concurs: «Les villes sont les lieux par excellence de cette interculturelité ... La ville idéale est une ville de mouvement et de changement, où les relations sont déterritorialisées, décloisonnées.»

The challenge facing today's cities is to cement together through civic commitment an increasingly diverse citizenry. Those that succeed will indeed be dynamic magnets for the mobile and the cosmopolitan; those that fail will be embittered places for those, often poor and excluded, trapped within them.

To turn this challenge around, managing ethnic diversity is largely an urban concern. For it is also in the city, where individuals find themselves cheek by jowl with the 'other', that violent intercommunal clashes take place (Horowitz, 2001: 381; Varshney, 2002: 6).

Great violent tragedies of recent years, from the siege of Sarajevo to the attack on the World Trade Centre, have had multicultural cities at their heart. Yet it is here, too, that '*new forms of human sociality, new modes of reciprocity*' (Amin and Thrift, 2002: 45) can redefine 'community' in more flexible and contemporary ways.

Recent work by Robert Putnam (2003) has demonstrated a negative correlation between ethnic diversity and 'social capital'—the cohesion of a city, say, as expressed in relationships of trust, agreed norms and vibrant networks. Los Angeles, for instance, scores very low on indices of social capital, such as confidence in government. Yet diversity is set only to increase and, as Putnam would argue, is basically 'healthy'.

So what is the answer? It may lie in his distinction between 'bonding' and 'bridging' social capital (Putnam, 2000: 22-23). The former is intracommunal, the latter intercommunal. Thus 'bridging social capital can generate broader identities and reciprocity, whereas bonding social capital bolsters our narrower selves', even leading to 'strong out-group antagonism'.

Bridging social capital, Putnam (2003) argues, is essential for democracy. A society that only has bonding social capital 'looks a lot like Belfast', he claims. Rev Ian Paisley, the leader of Protestant there for three and a half decades, once said of 'bridge-building' efforts that, like traitors, they went 'over to the other side'. Bridging, in this sense, means—as Ursula Röper (private correspondence) has put it—having the courage to go towards the 'stranger', and to be as ready to listen as to talk.

Putnam's contention dovetails neatly with the argument of Anant Varshney (2002: 281-282), in his study of six Indian cities, as to the relative merits of intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic associations. While not claiming that the former are of no utility, in his research 'they were not found useful for purposes of ethnic or communal peace'. And he insists: 'The key determinant of peace is *intercommunal* civic life, not civic life per se.'

But how can these inter-ethnic relationships be stimulated? Rogers (1997: 9-10), following Walzer, argues that urban space can be organised in a 'single-minded' or 'open-minded' ways. The former would comprise the conventional suburb, housing estate, industrial zone, car park or ring road. The latter would entail the busy square, the park, the lively street, the pavement café or the market. If the former favour an atomised, consumerist existence, "open-minded" places give us something in common: they bring diverse sections of society together and breed a sense of tolerance, awareness,

identity and mutual respect'. Similarly, Lebon (2002: 5) contends that «l'espace public transforme la diversité culturelle en interculturalité.»

Not automatically, however. Theoretically public spaces can be colonised by one demographic group and so shunned by others: city leaders will not thank planners who persuade them to invest in spaces that become vandalised and dominated by gangs of young men. Nor does contact, in itself, between individuals from different 'communities' necessarily lead to greater mutual understanding, associated as it can be with highly constrained and superficial engagements—as captured in the ironic phrase of the Irish poet Seamus Heaney, 'Whatever you say, say nothing.'

As Amin and Thrift (2002: 137) put it, 'Cultural hybridization requires meaningful and repeated contact, the slow experience of working, being and living with others, and the everyday fusion of cultures in what we consume, what we see, where we travel, how we live, with whom we play, and so on.' This more demanding representation of the challenge points us towards the importance of civic networks as conduits of repeated dialogue and supportive environments for exchanges in which body armour is willingly cast aside.

It can not be assumed that such networks will arise spontaneously. Indeed, care is needed to ensure that well-meaning policies of support for minority forms of cultural expression do not themselves inadvertently reproduce ghettoisation. As Lebon (2002: 7) writes, «Ces politiques doivent veiller à ne pas figer les cultures ou les groupes sociaux dans une identité déterminée une fois pour toutes, à ne pas occulter la diversité interne et l'évolution des groupes ou des communautés, marqués par leur culture d'origine, mais aussi par leur confrontation avec d'autres cultures et avec leur environnement.»

Zygmunt Bauman (2001) has eloquently written of how the aspiration to reside in the warmth of 'community', where reflection is not necessary, homogeneity can be assumed and identity is taken for granted, is a tantalising prospect. Yet individuals can only secure it by resigning their freedom. And Bauman (2001: 17) writes: "The really existing community" will be unlike their dreams—more like their opposite: it will add to their fears and insecurity instead of quashing them or putting them to rest. It will call for twenty-four hours a day vigilance and a daily sharpening of swords; for struggle, day in day out, to keep the aliens off the gates and to spy out and hunt down the turncoats in their own midst.' Ulrich Beck (1998: 138), in an essay on 'How Neighbours Become Jews', calls this the '*prison fallacy* of history'.

Citizenship only makes sense if all citizens are equal (which in ancient Greece did not of course apply to women or slaves). The *locus classicus* for this argument is the contrast in the US Supreme Court verdicts between *Plessy* (1896) and *Brown* (1954) on segregation. In the former case, the disingenuous claim by Louisiana that it provided 'equal but separate' accommodation for white and black passengers on trains was upheld. The *Brown* ruling, on schooling, overturned *Plessy* by insisting that separate facilities were 'inherently unequal' (Vile, 1999: 174).

Today, the stresses of cultural diversity are compounded by the socio-economic strains of modern urban life. According to Allen, Cars and Madanipour (1998: 7), 'Whether experiencing economic growth or decline, all major European cities are witnessing the symptoms of growing social exclusion'—long-term unemployment, widening income inequality, and related disparities in education and health. Amid intensified global competition, employers are transferring risk to casualised, temporary and part-time employees, putting strain on household and kinship supports. 'In many cities, these changes are especially visible in the spatial concentrations of immigrants and ethnic minority communities and in large areas with deteriorating environmental conditions.'

Pursuing their idea of a 'politics of the commons', Amin and Thrift (2002: 150) conclude: 'Our belief is that in order to encourage citizenship as an everyday practice, people need to experience negotiating diversity and difference. Yet this is exactly what has been put to the test in our times of associating with only those like you or whom you like. Citizenship has to develop through its *practice*, perhaps by taking individuals out of their daily communities.'

Pulling these various strands together, Michael Safier (1996) has eloquently defined 'the cosmopolitan challenge' of 'moving from conflict to co-existence'. He argues that 'collective cultural diversity is a characteristic of fully developed urban societies, and is to be recognised as contributing to the "quality

of life” of citizens and the “competitive advantage” of cities’. Cultural co-existence, he contends, includes:

- promoting a common civic identity and consciousness;
- celebrating a diversity of cultural affiliations;
- strengthening civil-society organisations; and
- facilitating cultural connections, and increasing capacities to accommodate new groups.

Safier contends that cultural co-existence can be seen as ‘producing a positive “value added”, a sum total of city life greater than the simple addition of its constituent groups’ and as having the potential ‘to mobilise efforts across a range of mutually reinforcing initiatives, to create some initial elements of a “virtuous circle” that can accumulate, over time, sufficient momentum to be self-sustaining’.

And that is why the challenge of sharing cities is as relevant to the economist as the educator, the citizen as to the civic leader.

### Lessons for policy-makers

Let us begin to spell out the implications of this in policy terms. First, a philosophical assertion: neither of the conventional models of citizenship, ideal-typically French and German, encompasses the demands of shared civic life. The former, based on *ius solis*, treats all those born of legal residents on the soil of the state universally as *citoyens*, refusing to recognise cultural diversity. (Hence, for example, the failure of France to ratify the Council of Europe Framework Convention on the Rights of National Minorities). The latter, based on *ius sanguinis*, accepts all those with ‘ethnic’ ties to the ‘nation’ as citizens, even where settled abroad (*die Ansiedler*), whereas longstanding immigrants can not become naturalised (*die Gastarbeiter*). (Hence, too, the difficulty Germany has had in coming to terms with being a ‘country of immigration’, though its citizenship laws have recently been softened.)

These two approaches are respectively associated with ‘assimilationist’ and ‘multiculturalist’ models of contemporary society. The former (as highlighted by *l’affaire des foulards*) requires members of minorities to adapt to the norms of the dominant majority. The latter poses no challenge to these norms either but assumes that minorities pursue a separate (and equally unchanged) cultural identity.

Neither subordination nor separatism is a basis for comity, however, in a diverse society—particularly in the context of the propinquity of a modern city. And so a third option has been increasingly canvassed: ‘integrationism’. Integrationism is premised on a balance being struck between the pursuit of cultural diversity and the maintenance of a civic society. Where that balance is struck at any time is determined through intercultural dialogue, which it is hoped will change *all* participants over time.

This linking of cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue privileges the development of a culture of tolerance, assuming as this does the dignity of every citizen and his/her interdependence with others. The absence of such a culture tells its own story.

Thus it is no surprise that it was in cities like Rostock in the former DDR *Länder* that the most bitter attacks took place on asylum-seekers in Germany in the early 90s. The ‘bureaucratic collectivism’ of Soviet-type *régimes* provided no basis for a culture of tolerance to thrive.

For municipal leaders and officials, as for non-governmental organisations and individual citizens, these are pressing concrete questions. What practical lessons can decision-makers learn as to how cities can be shared, rather than segregated?

The key conclusions are as follows:

- Physical barriers are the most visible signs of intercommunal intolerance. Walls dividing populations dehumanise those on the ‘other side’, rendered strangers as a result. The task here is to contest the ‘prison fallacy’ of identity, by which an illusory ‘security’ is gained at the expense of individual freedom, in favour of the expansion of genuinely **public space**.
- In as far as cities consist of interconnected networks, **civic networks** are key antidotes to ethnic conflict. Interfaith and intercultural relations, as well as secular cross-communal

movements like trade unions, moderate ethnic identities and absorb the effect of ethno-political 'shocks'.

- Cities must not become balkanised into discrete 'communities' embracing antagonistic collective narratives of the past. Where populations are divided the **media** and, more narrowly, **museums** have a critical role in challenging, rather than reproducing, stereotyped enemy images based on a selective reading of current affairs, and the past, in which the 'self' is always victim.
- Symbols are of major import in the conduct of ethnic conflicts. The **arts** have the potential to explore the play of identity and social possibility, in a manner that may help individuals appreciate better the multiplicity of their own identities and their inherent relatedness to the identities of others.
- Certitude in a complex and changing world is a dangerous thing, leading readily to intolerance. **Integrated education**, at all levels, not only brings individuals from different backgrounds together but at its best encourages them to reflect on their identities in a process of dialogue with one another. While this should begin in the nursery, it should embrace adults engaged in lifelong learning.
- In today's privatised lifestyle, the household is a major institution and the family a key factor in the socialisation of young people. **Mixed marriages** need to be protected and supported, in the face of intercommunal tensions.
- A critical counterweight to ethnic tensions is the idea of a common civic pride. The city can then become like a giant atrium under which all its inhabitants can shelter. Engendering such pride requires the exercise of **civic leadership** rather than ethnopolitical entrepreneurship. It can motivate the previously uninvolved or disengaged to develop anew their relationship with civic life.
- Ethnic conflicts are often complicated by the fact that minorities are linked to larger 'communities' with which their members may have affinity on the other side of borders. They may thus come to be seen as Trojan horses but can instead act as bridges across **porous borders** to other civilisations.

The remainder of this paper fleshes out each of these themes in more detail. While their precise adaptation will depend on the concrete situation, the ideas themselves are meant to be of universal application.

## Public space

Division can be manifested in physical form. Nicosia, like the rest of Cyprus, is divided by a 'buffer zone' between its Turkish and Cypriot parts, as Maria Hadjipavlou graphically highlighted at the Frankfurt-Oder round table: tourist maps of the city on the respective sides presented the area of the 'other' simply as a blank space—literally, uncharted territory. This was associated, she said, with the 'homogenisation' of the other, with no physical or even telephone contact (though nowadays, she reported, there were about 20 telephone lines, always busy, straddling the zone).

Such homogenisation had internal as well as external effects. On the Greek-Cypriot side, it rendered invisible Armenian, Maronite and more recent Asian minorities. Indeed, the latter were seen by some as a threat to the 'Greekness' of that side of the city.

Mitrovica has a river bisecting its Serbian and Albanian populations. The bridge over the river, which could connect them, was in fact the site of intercommunal clashes following the recent war, with a group of self-appointed paramilitary 'bridge watchers' defending the Serbian minority against Albanian encroachment. Symptomatic of how the trajectory of cities can influence wider trends in the country as a whole, the division of Mitrovica has been seen as the basis for a wider *de facto* partition of northern Kosovo, linked to Serbia, from the predominantly Albanian and increasingly independence-seeking south.

Ylber Hysa from Pristina warned that this was a negative answer to the problems facing the town, which would have wide consequences. For him the alternative was integration, with a view to Mitrovica becoming 'normal'. His counterpart Dušan Janjić argued that it was essential to transcend the dichotomous language of 'majority' and 'minority' in favour of speaking of an 'open society', 'interculturalism' and so on.

At the last count, Belfast had 37 'peace walls'—up from 15 in 1994, year of the paramilitary ceasefires. George Orwell would doubtless turn in his grave at this 'Newspeak', reminiscent of the *antifaschistische Schutzwall* that the Berlin Wall supposedly represented.

That these barriers should have proliferated, in response to sectarian clashes, during what was officially described as a 'peace process' (Orwell might have felt queasy about that too), is a sobering reminder that the philosophy that 'high fences make good neighbours' is self-defeating as well as morally tendentious. It is precisely at these walls that intercommunal tensions tend to ignite, and there are thus frequent calls for them to be made even higher and wider. The fundamental problem is that they represent the ultimate dehumanisation: why worry about throwing a missile if you can not see the human being wounded on the other side?

Physical barriers are, of course, only part of the story. Even though the Berlin Wall came down to general acclaim, sharing that city in the intervening 14 years has not proved as simple as many had envisaged. One of the fundamental goals of the *Planwerk Innenstadt* is the 'mental reintegration' of its formerly divided citizens. Yet, according to Haans-Uve Schwedler (2001), discussing the travails of planning in Berlin during the last decade, the continuing strength of the former Communist Party in the former east Berlin speaks of a 'mentally divided city' still.

So what keeps these 'walls in the head' erect? Insecurity is a defining feature of a globalised and uncertain age. It is this, argued Tony Gallagher from Belfast, which encourages 'communities' to look inwards and develop essentialist identities. At the margin, he contended, this shaded into violence, in a vain attempt to 'fix the unfixable'.

Yet fixed identities were incompatible with a dynamic environment. Minorities, who could act as a bridge and a stimulant, then became a threat. Yet, paradoxically, all such efforts to achieve security via *Die Mauer im Kopf* only achieved more insecurity, he said—for, echoing Bauman, the barbarians were always at the gate.

This was why breaking down such walls—physical or mental—was so important. It allowed a move from exclusive to inclusive identities, from independence to interdependence, Prof Gallagher said.

There is an important lesson here for the funding of associations by public authorities. The report for the UK Home Office on the riots in northern English mill towns in 2001 (Cantle, 2001: 37-38) concluded: 'We have been struck by the apparent success of those areas where funding has been used to build a coalition of interests and where there are firm expectations about working together for the good of that particular area. That can be contrasted with areas that have resourced many separate and distinct community interests, often for very similar purposes. These tend to reinforce cultural differences (and is [sic] inherently less efficient).' The report argued that there should be a presumption against funding for distinct 'communities', in favour of cross-communal 'themes'.

But how can *collective* security develop in the city? This is where civic networks come in.

### **Civic networks**

Varshney (2002) has demonstrated conclusively that civic networks are the best antidote to intercommunal violence. In particular, while quotidian connections such as cross-communal visits are helpful in this regard, it is *associational* links that are most effective: business associations, trade unions, sports clubs, professional organisations and so on.

Varshney's work on Hindu-Muslim relations in India is uncannily similar to the independent 'peace enclaves' study in former Yugoslavia. In each case, three pairs of cities—one violent, one peaceful—were selected for study.

From his research Varshney (2002: 4) concludes: 'Vigorous associational life, if intercommunal, acts as a serious constraint on the polarizing strategies of political elites.' By contrast (Varshney, 2002: 12), 'A multiethnic society with few interconnections across ethnic boundaries is very vulnerable to ethnic disorders and violence.' Of one of India's most riot-prone cities, Varshney (2002: 15) writes: 'One can actually live one's entire life in Hyderabad's old city without spending more than a small amount of time with members of the other community.'

This has powerful resonance with the Cantle (2001: 9) report referred to above. In towns like Oldham, Bradford and Burnley, the review team were shocked to discover the extent to which 'many communities operate on the basis of a series of parallel lives'. Similarly, Mr Janjić told the seminar that in Mitrovica Serbs and ethnic Albanians lived in 'parallel worlds'.

In an account which, again, chimes neatly with Putnam's discussion of social capital in the US, Varshney (2002: 127) paints this picture of intercommunal civic associations in peaceful Calicut, in the southern Indian state of Kerala: 'Much like Tocqueville's America, Calicut is a place of "joiners". Associations of all kinds—business, labour, professional, social, theatre, film, sports, art, reading—abound. From the ubiquitous trade associations to Lions and Rotary Clubs, reading clubs, the head-loaders' association, the rickshaw-pullers' association, and even something like an art-lovers' association, citizens of Calicut excel in joining clubs and associations.' And while there are religiously-based organisations, as in cities marked by violence, 'what is distinctive is the extent of interreligious interaction in nondenominational organizations'.

It was the same story in Tuzla, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the early 90s (Petaux *et al*, 2002: 11-12). According to its former mayor, Selim Beslagič, traditions of inter-faith and intercultural relations in the town, allied to the traditional solidarity of the labour movement, were able to protect Tuzla from the spreading flames of interethnic conflict.

If civic networks do not necessarily emerge spontaneously to counter potential 'shocks' to ethnically diverse cities, is the alternative to bring them about by coercion? Apart from the ethical issues this raises, the US experience of 'bussing' would suggest this is not feasible either.

But it is perfectly legitimate and practicable for civic authorities to *broker* such networks, including by assisting civic actors and NGOs to establish them. Indeed, in the context of a 'politics of the commons', it becomes a civic *duty* so to act.

A simple but compelling example is an initiative piloted in Bradford in the wake of the riots there (Tessenyi, 2002: 4-5). This drew together 13 individuals aged between 20 and 30, identified as prospective leaders across the various 'communities' in the city, for one week of discussions, assisted by a range of speakers from divided societies. Within weeks of the event, the participants set up a Bradford Intercultural Network. The intention is to repeat the initiative and to replicate it elsewhere.

Another instance reported at the Council of Europe expert colloquy on intercultural and inter-religious dialogue was Marseille-Espérance (Etienne, 2002: 6). Expressing the remarkable diversity of the city, this association brings together representatives from roughly 20 different faiths for meetings once or twice a month to discuss social or cultural issues or simply calendar clashes—a multi-religious calendar is posted in places of worship. Every year, it also organises an intercultural festival in the city's opera house and a debate, attended by thousands, on a subject with religious connotations (such as bioethics).

Etienne comments: 'In the darkest times (the [first] Gulf War, murders of a number of young men, the Second Intifada, etc.) *Marseille-Espérance* and the radio stations serving the different religions or communities have played a major role in promoting social peace, without pursuing any political agenda, while others elsewhere were busy "fanning the flames".'

Fanning the flames requires receptive audiences if the wildfire is to spread. So we now turn to the role of the media and museums in reproducing communal narratives—or, potentially, challenging them.



## Media/Museums

With the black humour typical of the place, the Belfast writer Glenn Patterson defines the meaning of 'community' in his native society as 'another word for side'. The anthropologist Neil Jarman (2002: 17), another resident of the city, has in more academic language criticised this 'essentialised sense of difference and otherness'. He writes: 'The notion of two communities, two cultures, two traditions, two identities or two tribes dominates perceptions, practices and processes. The effectively unknown "other" is always present to be invoked and confronted as a source of fear and threat rather than as something positive or as something to be engaged with and understood ... Among many sections of both communities, the history of violence is widely commemorated, and even celebrated, and all too readily it is held up as something to be emulated.'

Such *imagined* communities (to borrow a phrase from Benedict Anderson's (1991) discussion of nationalism) are cemented by common narratives of the past—which, of course, are mutually incompatible. Thus, for example, as Ms Hadjipavlou pointed out, in Nicosia there is no agreement between the two sides even as to when the conflict 'started'. (For Turkish-Cypriot protagonists, it was when the Greek-Cypriot leader, Archbishop Makarios, proposed 13 constitutional amendments in 1963, favouring the Greek-Cypriot side in a range of disputes and precipitating intercommunal clashes in the city. For the latter, it was when the Turkish army invaded in 1974 and the breakaway 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus' was established, a secession only recognised by Turkey.)

Museums are thus critical institutions in divided cities. In Nicosia, according to Ms Hadjipavlou, stereotyped histories are reproduced by museums presenting a heroes-and-villains view of the past. In Belfast, according to Gallagher and Wilson, the Ulster Museum has sought to reach out to the citizenry as a whole. For example, an exhibition on the bicentennial of the rebellion by the (republican but mainly Protestant-led) United Irishmen of 1798 provided a challenge to stereotyped views.

A usable past is essential if a common, civic vision of the future is to be elaborated. Here a useful steer is provided by Jean Petaux (Petaux *et al*, 2002: 15). He argues that a path needs to be charted between 'collective amnesia', which makes a repeat of past tragedies possible as their lessons have not been learnt, and 'mnemonic obsession', which rakes over past conflicts from one generation to the next. Cross-communal memorialising—an archive of victims' stories and a 'day of reflection' have been suggested for Northern Ireland (Healing Through Remembering, 2002)—is one way of achieving this.

It is, it is important to stress, by no means inevitable that historic enmities will automatically be sustained into the indefinite future. Essentialist talk of 'ancient hatreds' (Glenny, 1999: xxiv), rehearsed when those who had lived as neighbours in former Yugoslavia resorted to violence against each other, does not explain why long periods of inter-ethnic peace are possible.

Indeed, the sociologist Rogers Brubaker (2002) argues that, left to themselves, the embers of ethnic hatred tend to burn out over time, as quotidian interests take over. In that (optimistic) sense, they have to be actively reproduced to be sustained. And, clearly, a major role is played here by the media—providing citizens as they do with information about events of which they have no direct experience and, more importantly, providing a frame of reference for how such events are understood.

The 'peace enclaves' team, led by Vjieran Katunaric, has explored to what degree headlines during the violence in ex-Yugoslavia were 'politically correct', 'neutral' or purveyed 'stereotypes'. Stereotypes are critical to reproducing the vicious circles by which human beings—those former neighbours—are reduced to mere emblems of the 'enemy' group. And the media are thus critical in the 'degenerate spirals of communication' (Giddens, 1994: 243) that bring horrific violence in their train.

The researchers looked at Osijek in Croatia—a city that had been peaceful but became violent. They found that content analysis of the local *Voice of Slavonia* betrayed an associated shift towards stereotypical coverage, especially *vis-à-vis* political commentaries.

Commenting on the Belfast case, Gallagher and Wilson pointed to the fact that the city has two communally distinct morning newspapers, and that lazy reporting—using as 'shorthand' ideologically loaded phrases like 'the unionist community'—helped reproduce divisions.

Stereotypes always dissolve the individual into the (stigmatised) group. And here the individual artist has an important counter-role to play.

### The arts

At the heart of the creative city must be the creative arts. And in as much as they allow of an exploration of the plastic against the fixed, the complex against the simple, and the potential against the actual, they offer a medium outside conventional discourse for issues of interculturalism to be addressed.

Istvan Szabo's *Sunshine*, for instance, portrays the lives of several generations of a Jewish family in Hungary, from the Austro-Hungarian empire through Nazism to Communism and its demise. Via the device of a succession of male characters all being played by Ralph Fiennes, we see in one figure the successive tensions of the denial of Jewishness for purposes of assimilation, the donning of a chauvinistic Hungarian nationalism and the opportunistic embrace of Stalinism. The film invites us to see all these as dark aspects of what it means to be 'Hungarian' today.

The Transcarpathian city of Uzhgorod has been through similar historical travails—part of Austro-Hungary until 1918, of Czechoslovakia until 1938, of Hungary until 1944, of the Soviet Union until 1991, and now part of independent Ukraine, as Katarzyna Stoklosa reported to the round table. According to Ms Stoklosa, no other city in Europe has been subject to so many changes of jurisdiction (changing its name, too, along the way).

In terms of cultural diversity, the main legacy is a large Hungarian minority. Yet Uzhgorod has a positive story to tell. Ms Stoklosa asked in her study of the city whether (as has happened elsewhere) support for diverse cultural initiatives had tended to have divisive effects, strengthening nationalist tensions. Her conclusion was that in Uzhgorod such initiatives had had a connecting, rather than disconnecting, effect between groups.

The autonomy of the artist allows him or her, at least in principle, to stand back from and reflect upon taken-for-granted identities. The writer Amin Maalouf (2000: 3) begins his wonderful book *On Identity*: 'How many times, since I left Lebanon in 1976 to live in France, have people asked me, with the best intentions in the world, whether I felt "more French" or "more Lebanese"? And I always give the same answer: "Both!" I say that not in the interests of fairness or balance, but because any other answer would be a lie. What makes me myself rather than anyone else is the very fact that I am poised between two countries, two or three languages and several cultural traditions. It is precisely this that defines my identity. Would I exist more authentically if I cut off a part of myself?'

Lebon (2002: 8) agrees that artists should not be forced by cultural politics into simplified identities: 'Etre artiste prévaut sur le fait d'être «d'origine étrangère».' Gallagher and Wilson warned that in Belfast 'community arts' had had just this simplifying effect, and had been sponsored by the more extreme parties on the city council at the expense of cuts in the arts budget elsewhere. They similarly contrasted the organisation of festivals in Belfast—there are, inevitably, two big, non-overlapping annual events—with the single triumph every year that is the Galway Arts Festival (in a city much more at ease with itself).

This is where the Council of Europe's 'flagship initiatives' activity within *Intercultural Dialogue and Conflict Prevention* Project comes in. According to the expert in charge of the activity, Ursula Röper, flagship initiatives are seeking through the vehicle of popular exhibition to encourage fresh thinking about 'others', without which she would argue one cannot understand one's own identity.

The working title is 'Histories of Dialogue' and the aim is to reach out to artists who have been involved in peace education—Ms Röper sees the project as creating an 'aesthetic window' on to intercultural dialogue. The exhibition will have a modular character, with a common European element and part compiled by a local team in the city involved.

Mr Hysa pointed out that, owing to mistrustful intercommunal relationships, successive cultural initiatives in Mitrovica—such as the 'Cultural Container', even deployed on the contested bridge—had

tended to be sponsored by outside third parties. The ‘flagship’ idea would fit this perspective neatly, given the widespread perception across the continent of the Council of Europe as honest broker.

So let us now turn to the role of local civic leaders.

### **Civic leadership**

Ethnopolitical entrepreneurs thrive where a civic culture is weak. Ms Stoklosa drew out from her study of Uzhgorod the importance of a civic sense of place as a centripetal force amid ethnic diversity. This may well explain why support for cultural diversity in the city has not had unintended polarising effects.

She concluded: ‘The existence of a regional identity in Uzhgorod, a common feeling of belonging to a cultural and historical territory, works as a bond between different ethnic, religious and linguistic groups. The traditional, pre-nationalistic links with the territory (“I come from here”) can converge with conscious inter-relational activities of the minorities’ organizations.’

Amid the decay of post-industrial northern England, the neo-fascist British National Party has secured pockets of support among the white *Lumpenproletariat*. The Cantle (2001: 17) report found: ‘Where a culture of blame was evident it appeared that community cohesion was going to be impossible to achieve. Where the local political leadership was either weak or divided, it left a vacuum which was then easy for extremist groups to move in and exploit.’

In Antwerp, similarly, the Vlaams Blok is the single largest party on the council, holding at the time of writing 20 out of 55 seats. It has exploited a system—similar to the Austrian *Proporz* so instrumental in the rise of Jörg Haider’s Freedom Party—by which jobs and funds have since the 20s traditionally been distributed along party lines by the dominant Christian Democrats and Socialists (Roxburgh, 2002: 189-90).

The blok, whose leader, Filip Dewinter, hails from Antwerp, has presented itself as the voice of the Flemish ‘little man’ against these powerful forces—and, of course, against the Muslim (Turkish and Moroccan) immigrants similarly deemed to be ‘stealing jobs’ from him. In March 2003, the party’s electoral fortunes were further boosted by the resignation of the mayor and all ten members of the city government, occasioned by accusations that they had abused expense accounts for personal gain (*Guardian*, March 14<sup>th</sup> 2003).

The Antwerp story reminds us of how social exclusion and ethnic division can combine to explosive effect. In their study of Belfast, Gallagher and Wilson pointed out how the city’s ‘ghettoised’ feel was a product of the overlaying of communal polarisation and social disadvantage. This, they argued, ensured that working-class concerns were (mis)articulated through the distorting and conflictual lenses of sectarian and paramilitary political figures.

A sharp contrast to both stories is offered by Tuzla in the early 90s. The mayor, Mr Beslagič, tells (Petaux *et al*, 2002: 12) of how he and his colleagues from the town hall acted to insulate Tuzla against the war. They knocked on every door in the multi-ethnic town to talk, and listen, to the citizens—with a view to keeping alive the tradition of trust in their political representatives.

One interesting idea (Petaux *et al*, 2002: 12) is a declaration that political leaders in shared cities could embrace, ruling out the (ab)use of culture to divide communities for political ends. Even if honoured more in the breach than the observance, this would be a valuable symbolic statement. A precedent can be found in the way the Commission for Racial Equality in Britain urged politicians to abjure playing the ‘race card’ in the 2001 elections.

The Cantle (2001) report was particularly encouraged by positive attitudes towards interculturalism among young people. And we turn next to integrated education.

## Integrated education

In Nicosia, children on either side of the buffer zone go to schools where they are taught contrasting histories. According to Ms Hadjipavlou, these tend to be drawn from Greece and Turkey. Efforts to change this practice had met strong resistance from nationalists on either side, she said. And if, as she remarked, 'in a conflict culture everything is polarised'—with the self always the victim and the other always demonised—one response is obviously to start by depolarising the youngsters.

One of the great potential virtues of integrated education is that it can assist young people to resist the imposition of 'truth-claims' in the name of religion or political dogma—what Prof Gallagher calls 'the arrogance of certainty' (Petiaux *et al*, 2002: 35). Interestingly, the experience of the *foyer* project for young people in Bradford was that young people who mixed in this sort of environment did not favour mono-cultural or single-faith schools (Cantle, 2001: 16).

Recently, research has been published on the effects—including the long-term effects—of integrated education on young people in Northern Ireland (Montgomery *et al*, 2003). And the evidence is encouraging. It is not that so much that they develop a substantive, third identity, as against the two ethno-nationalist positions that face each other antagonistically across the sectarian divide. It is more that the former integrated students manifest, including many years after leaving the integrated school, a more tolerant *approach* to identity than would otherwise be the case.

Religion is a particularly fraught subject in the school. But Norman Richardson (Petiaux *et al*, 2002: 17) makes a useful distinction between the teaching of religion as a subject and a faith. The former would imply a need to focus particularly on an understanding of the religions of others, whereas the latter implies mere dogmatic inculcation of one's own.

The Cantle (2001: 35) report, like a recent review of the transition from primary to post-primary education in Northern Ireland in which Prof Gallagher was involved, recognised that integrated schools were not going to replace segregated schools wholesale any time soon. Both these reports proposed that around the umbra of integrated schools there should be a wider penumbra of encouraging change within existing schools, such as via inter-school links. Similarly, where language is an ethnic barrier, teaching the language of the 'other' in school is clearly important.

Another important dimension in all schools is citizenship education. This is critical to socialising young people into a civic culture generally. It may also help them acquire the capacity—including the language—to develop as autonomous individuals, secure with a complex and evolving identity and tolerant of divergent identities. At best it can assist them to become effective civic actors in their own right, with an ability to reflect critically on themselves and to engage in dialogue with others—the network-makers of tomorrow.

Education is, however—or at least should be—a lifelong endeavour. And there can never be too much education for cultural diversity and interculturalism, or too many people engaged by it. Indeed, it is all too rare for those in sensitive professions—journalists or doctors, for instance—to receive any education in this arena at all. Knowing how to cope with diversity through dialogue is not an optional extra for anyone: increasingly, it is a precondition of modern life.

And so it is to adult life, and in particular intimate adult relationships, that we now turn.

## Mixed marriages

The complex history of Uzhgorod has inevitably penetrated family genealogies too. A cook in the state university told Ms Stoklosa that she spoke Ukrainian, Russian and Romanian (and understood Hungarian), her parents had been Hungarian and Romanian (though had carried Soviet passports), and she had a Ukrainian passport (having previously had a Soviet one). Her conclusion? 'All I can say is that I am from here, from Uzhgorod ...'

Another interviewee in Uzhgorod, the director of the Cultural Association of the National Minorities of Transcarpathia, made a corollary point in an upbeat assessment of interethnic relations. Because in

almost every family different nationalities were represented, he said, 'The people from here are used to live [sic] together.'

Mixed relationships have the potential to offer another avenue of socialisation for young people, straddling communalist cultures and potentially questioning the associated historical narratives. There has been an implicit recognition of this 'threat' in Belfast, where 'loyalist' paramilitaries have not just 'ethnically cleansed' Catholics from predominantly Protestant areas but also those in mixed marriages.

By the same token, interculturalists are duty-bound to protect and nurture mixed relationships. Again in Belfast, the housing authorities have reacted to intimidation by assisting the victim to leave the area. Yet this sends a clear moral signal to the perpetrator that intimidation pays, when it should be the other way around: the paramilitary should be punished by the authorities as a deterrent to similar behaviour by others.

Part of that nurturing is to ensure that the parents have integrated schools to which to send their youngsters, avoiding the otherwise invidious choices once again of minority subordination or separatism. Fascinatingly, the research on integrated education in Northern Ireland (Montgomery *et al*, 2003) shows not only an attitudinal but also a behavioural change: adults who have been to integrated schools are at least as likely to have a partner from the 'other side' as 'their own', in sharp contrast to the strong pattern of endogamy in the region.

Integration, however, cuts both ways. If it places (reasonable) requirements on minority citizens, they too must feel that their (equally reasonable) feelings of association with a *Heimat* from which they have come or from which they have been severed by a border are being treated with sensitivity.

And so we turn, finally, to addressing another source of division—borders.

### **Porous borders**

For cities in close proximity to borders, there is a special challenge: can they ensure that such borders represent a mere one-dimensional line, rather than a two-dimensional wall?

Narva is a predominantly Russian-speaking city historically linked to Ivangorod. But it has been deposited by the collapse of the USSR on the 'wrong' side of the Estonian-Russian border, marked by the Narva river. Gulnara Roll explained how cultural events which brought people from Narva and Ivangorod provided reassurance to Estonia's Russophile minority in this region. Yet this was not at the expense of interculturalism: an 'Estonian House' had been opened in the city in 2002 to encourage Estonian- and Russian-speakers to meet, and to assist young people in learning Estonian.

Krzysztof Wojciechowski, director of the Collegium Polonicum in Slubice, just across the border in Poland from Frankfurt-Oder, has himself been dealing with this challenge for several years.

Dr Wojciechowski sees a key role for people who are 'at home in both cultures' and who can thus build 'personal small bridges' across cultural divides, as such a person is capable of 'incorporating the other side into his public life'. When the Wall came down, he said, there were only a handful of such individuals on either side of the German-Polish border. Now, he said, there were hundreds, and the situation had improved greatly.

### **Conclusion**

Any and all of the above recommendations can be taken forward by any municipal authority. The Council of Europe's Congress of Local and Regional Authorities provides a pre-existing vehicle for co-operative endeavour and exchange of good practice. Another is the Forum Européen pour la Sécurité Urbaine.

But one suggestion at the Frankfurt-Oder seminar, for a more focused effort by a network of 'shared cities', may be worth pursuing. Mr Tessenyi proposed the idea of 'Cities Overcoming Division in Europe' (CODE). The irony of dealing with diversity, of course, is that it both involves diverse

challenges and common concerns. Such a specific network could offer the means for these to be addressed.

All the lessons set out above are conclusions towards the same end. A city is like an ecosystem. Monocultures are static and vulnerable to external shocks, such as disease, which may kill them. Ecosystems work because their diversity and cross-fertilisation ensure rapid evolution and a resilience in the face of environmental shocks.

A city must strive to be the latter. A multiplicity of identities, a sense of interdependence and a spirit of tolerance are the prerequisites of success. And a wide range of civic and political actors share the responsibility to achieve it.

For these are not the concerns only of those who wish to see better intercommunal relations. All the evidence indicates that those whose primary focus is on urban regeneration and municipal promotion ignore at their peril the challenges posed by cultural diversity, as well as—more positively—failing to capitalise on the opportunities such diversity creates.

The conclusions of the UK Urban Task Force (1999: 45) are thus of more general European application: 'To succeed, the urban environment of the future must foster and protect the diversity of its inhabitants while ensuring that all enjoy access to the range of services and activities which constitute the best of urban life. Without a commitment to social integration, our towns and cities will fail.'

As citizens, the onus is on all of us to ensure that our cities, a great bequest of centuries of civilisation, do not.

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